Repeated citations of Johnson & Johnson's handling of the 1982 Tylenol murders as the "gold standard of crisis PR" neglect key facts surrounding that tragedy, says a study of "iconic" PR crises in the winter online "PR Journal" of the PR Society of America.
That phrase was used in the April 10 Economist to describe J&J's handling of the murders.
Tony Jaques, lecturer at the School of Applied Communication, RMIT University, Melbourne, says "misleading or inappropriate lessons can easily be drawn" from such cases as Tylenol and Exxon-Valdez.
He notes that J&J achieved fame for its nationwide recall of Tylenol capsules but its first move was to withdraw two small lots from the Chicago area.
The nationwide recall only came five days after the first death was attributed to poisoned Tylenols, he says.
In today's environment, he adds, "It is difficult to conceive that seven deaths would not lead to an immediate national recall."
Tony Jaques |
He quotes B.A. Olaniran of Texas Tech University and D.E. Williams, formerly of TTU, as questioning why J&J waited until the murder of 23-year-old Diane Elsworth of Peekskill, N.Y. in 1986 "before replacing the demonstrably vulnerable capsules with tamper-proof solid product."
They wrote in PR Review in 1994: "It is uncertain whether, but quite possible that J&J based its decision not to withdraw capsules purely on financial reasons."
Jaques commented that "If true, this would, at the very least, color the much-vaunted ‘gold standard' response to the first poisoning and the apparent management learning."
J&J often cites its "credo" that allegedly puts the welfare of its consumers first.
Tried to 'Hide' J&J Involvement
Jaques, an issue and crisis management specialist, said "a lesser known feature of the Tylenol story" is that J&J initially focused attention on its McNeil subsidiary, deflecting attention away from itself.
Early announcements and news reports "provided all mention of the company as McNeil," he writes.
Some of the ads telling how to exchange capsules for tablets only referred to "the makers of Tylenol," he notes.
Writes Jaques: "The concept of a parent company using a subsidiary identity to protect its name during a crisis, or obscuring its identity entirely, was effectively demonstrated, though this is not usually part of the ‘fable.'
Another flaw in the Tylenol story, says Jaques, is that J&J VP-PR Larry Foster at first said there was no cyanide present in company plants but later reversed himself and won praise for "volunteering this information to reporters."
Actually, wrote Jaques, the AP found out about the cyanide and Foster only discussed it after reporters raised the question.
Carol Gorney |
J&J portrayed itself as a "victim" and "product friendly" news media of the time gave it "unchallenged media opportunities to tell its own story and promote its new packaging."
This quote is attributed to Carole Gorney, retired professor emeritus of Lehigh University, a Fellow of PRSA and longtime leader of the Society. Now with The Cline Group, Bala Cynwyd, Pa., she was in the five-member Philadelphia Assembly delegation in 2004. All five voted against non-APRs being allowed in the Assembly although that bylaw change passed.
Gorney, in PR Strategist of PRSA in 2002 decries the "mystification" of the Tylenol crisis and feels it has become "almost mythical in both the mass media and PR literature," says Jaques.
Some Perpetuate Tylenol Myth
Washington, D.C., counselor Eric Dezenhall, described by Jaques as a "contrarian," has "cynically asserted that many parties have a vested interest in perpetuating what he called the Tylenol legend," writes Jaques.
Dezenhall's 2004 book, "Damage Control," is quoted as saying, "The media love the story because it validates the canard that ‘fessing up' is the best form of crisis management. Business schools worship the model because it's teachable and had a happy ending for the manufacturer. PR firms use it to sell spin as the answer to industrial woes."
Concludes Jaques: "Deeper examination of the Tylenol and Exxon Valdez incidents indicates how easy it is to be led to wrong or inappropriate lessons from highly exposed cases."
Exxon, held to be tardy and insensitive in handling the oil spill in Alaska, is usually portrayed as the polar opposite of Tylenol, he notes.
"As literary fables are fictitious or legendary tales intended to convey a moral, so too some of the iconic crisis cases have become little more than shorthand references, or Burkian ‘representative anecdotes,' intended to encapsulate a supposed maxim of crisis management or crisis communication," he writes.
He wants current managers and schools to analyze new case studies that "can provide the basis for genuine learning."
A big lesson that oil companies learned in 1989 "was not to identify the owning company in the names of oil tankers."
The Exxon Valdez was renamed the "Sea River Mediterranean."
The 16-page paper of Jaques including 49 references is here (PDF).
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