By David Brown
The full body scan and pat down defended by the Transportation Security Administration’s Director John Pistole as necessary for airline passengers is a public relations disaster. It is a pure and simple case of the government ramming a procedure down the throats of the unsuspecting public.
The same can be said for healthcare reform. Both are bitter pills to swallow.
The TSA has a relatively short memory. During 1969-70, I was the press officer for the Federal Aviation Administration’s anti-skyjacking team called Task Force on the Deterrence of Air Piracy. We developed, tested, and verified a screening procedure that had as Step One a characteristics-based “profile.”
If a passenger ticked off at least six of the nearly two dozen elements, he/she was taken aside and thoroughly searched and interrogated. The search device we used was an off-the-shelf “mine detector” dating back to WWII.
A three-man team (I was one) traveled to nine airports to determine how many passengers would trigger those six required elements. Our conclusion was 5-10ths of 1 percent! That meant we could facilitate the boarding of the other 99.5 percent. Not only did the ACLU “bless” the “profile,” but a New York Federal Court would rule it did not violate the 4th Amendment to the Constitution on search and seizure.
Not only did I hold press conferences at each airport, but I also videotaped passenger reaction. Of more than 200 newspaper articles, only a handful were negative. Reporters appreciated our openness, and did not object to our keeping secret the “profile” elements (most of which have not been revealed to this day). Their stories highlighted the “secret” profile, which fulfilled our approach as “psychological warfare.”
Our chief psychologist, Dr. John T. Dailey, believed strongly that this would be a deterrent to would-be skyjackers, and it worked. Not only did we have the press on our side, but also the public. In my videotapings, not one passenger objected to our procedure.
Our multi-disciplined, nine-man task force was disbanded in August 1970 after our work was completed, replaced with a “cop shop.” Only our security representative was assigned to the new entity.
One month later, our successful approach was historically altered, which has led to what we have today – a public relations nightmare and a public rebellion. Four U.S. aircraft were skyjacked, and the Nixon administration replaced the selective “profile” as Step One with total electronic screening.
The problem is that the skyjackings took place in the Middle East, not on U.S. soil. This set the stage for the false assumption that to prevent Middle East terrorists from repeating the 9/11 catastrophe you had to believe all U.S. airline passengers were potential terrorists, and therefore had to “prove their innocence.” Had it not been for the rationale that this was legal because we were “at war” with Iraq, the protection against illegal search would have led to multiple law suits.
Ironically, from all reports I have seen, all 19 Middle East terrorists evidenced at least those six elements. Had our “profile” still been Step One, they no doubt would not have been able to board their flights.
The government’s security officials claim everyone old and young needs those intrusive searches to prevent another 9/11. But, they never laid the groundwork we did and tested a theory – which is what that claim really is. We anticipated almost every concern and devised a coordinated response both to the news media and the public. By the way, our 1978 Final Report predicted that terrorists (yes, that was the term used) would highjack U.S. aircraft.
Our testing at nine airports (I strongly argued for that man) produced unanticipated side results. At San Jaun, we discovered there was an agriculture inspection procedure, which we agreed could be used for passenger screening. At the old LaGuardia Airport, we were told a number of weapons and even narcotics were being discarded in potted plants near the boarding gates by people who believed the “profile” would nab them.
A gate attendant called me to complain that he was told the Mafia would stop flying from that airport because of the “profile.” Our “psychological” approach worked.
Also, while I arranged for warning signs to be printed in Spanish as well as English, I discovered slight changes in wording were needed along the East Coast than from the West Coast – Hispanic versus Latino.
Finally, a recent online news story revealed that the chief of security of El Al Airlines is convinced the intrusive searches are not necessary in favor to passenger “profiles.” Thus, we have come full circle, but the government is obstinate. This total pre-boarding search never has caught a Middle East terrorist, but has nabbed domestic nut cases.
Our task force succeeded because we had the passengers and the airlines in mind. Also, the term “deterrence” was on purpose because we agreed we never could stop all skyjacking attempts, no more than police can stop all crime.
David H. Brown. Also, I neglected to mention I founded and was first president of he National Association of Government Communicators.
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David Brown, a retired government information officer, was first president of the National Assn of Government Communicators and former Washington correspondent for O’Dwyer’s Newsletter.
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