The Clerk: Calling cases 11-CV-213 East End Eruv Association, Inc. v The Village of Westhampton Beach, et al., 11-CV-252, Verizon New York, Inc, etal. v Village of Westhampton Beach, et al., and 1B-CV-4810, East End Eruv Association, Inc, et al v. The Town of Southampton, et al.

Please state appearance for the record:

Robert Sugarman and Yehudah Buchweitz for the East End Eruv Association

Erica Weisgerber, Debevoise & Plimpton for Verizon NY

Zachary Murdock, Lazer Aptheker Rosella & Yedid, for LIPA

Brian Sokoloff, Sokoloff Stern LLP, for Village of Westhampton Beach

Maureen Liccione, Jaspan Schlesinger for the Town of Southampton

David Arnsten and Josh Shleierman for Village of Quogue

The Court: Good afternoon to everybody. It’s been awhile. I decided that I would rather have you in than try to have a phone conference with this small army of attorneys. Really my primary matter I want to deal with this afternoon is to give each of you an opportunity to tell me where we’re going with these cases in light of the decisions---both the published decision in the Second Circuit from Judge Raggi, Jacobs and Livingston and the other summary order that was issues. I really need to come to some resolution here. If the cases are continuing we need to get the rest of the schedule in place. That’s really what I want to talk about today. So let me start with Plaintiffs.

Sugarman: First with respect to Westhampton Beach, the decision of the 2nd Circuit eliminates the 2nd of the arguments that WHB had with respect to Eruv. The first one was the authority issue, which 2nd Circuit has decided, adverse to WHB.

So the plaintiffs have requested that you rule on the plaintiff’s summary judgment motion, on their declaratory judgment claim and to dismiss the affirmative defenses, all of which revolve around those two issues. So with respect to WHB, the case is ripe for a decision on the plaintiff’s declaratory judgment claim and the defendants’ affirmative defenses.

That would leave in WHB the remainder of plaintiff’s claim, free exercise, 1893, Rilupa(ph), tortious interference. With respect to those, there needs to be the completion of discovery. Document discovery has been complete and depositions need to be taken. So that’s the situation with respect to WHB.

With respect to Quogue, your Honor invited the parties to answer your question as to whether you had sufficient information to decide the issue of the sign law in Quogue. The parties briefed that by letter and that is subjudice before your honor. So with respect to Quogue, the sign law issue is ripe for your decision.

That would leave---let me add one more thing to that. The 2nd Circuit’s decision that it is not a violation of the establishment clause takes one of the Village of Quogue’s arguments in support of their sign law decision away because one of those arguments was---and one of the bases of the Quogue Village board decision that the leches(ph) violated the sign law was the concern that any other decision would be a violation of the establish clause. Based on the 2nd Circuit decision, that argument no longer hold water.

So with respect to Quogue, there is the issue of the sign law and then there are other issues, same as WHB, free exercise under the First Amendment, 1983, Rilupa, etc.

With respect to SH, you dismissed the claim with respect to the sign law of the village of SH---sorry, the Town of SH, and the plaintiffs have filed an Article 78 proceeding in state court which fully submitted to the supreme court justice and we’re awaiting a decision with respect to that. You stayed the remainder of that case pending the decision on the resolution of that issue.

The Court: Yes.

Sugarman: What we would request---and to back up for a second, you have stayed depositions in the Quogue and WHB cases. So with respect to the three in terms of discovery, this case is now in it’s fifth year and we would---

The Court: God help us all.

Sugarman: At least we’re all still here, which is good news. We would request that the stay in SH be lifted and that we be allowed to proceed with depositions I WHB and Quogue, so that we can move the case along and so that when your honor renders her decision in the Quogue sign law issue and when the state court renders its decisions on the SH sign law, we will not, however many months down the road have to basically then start with the discovery that we need on the other claims and that could be in the 6th year or the 7th year or who knows.

So what we would urge is that we be given the opportunity, in parallel with your decisions on the sign law and the state court decision on the SH sign law to move forward with whatever depositions are necessary to put the other claims that I’ve enumerated into a situation where they can be resolved, whether by motion or trail.

Court: All right. Let me hear from the defendants.

Sokoloff: First of all there were 2 bases for the affirmative defenses that we had here, one of which you honor adjudicated, and that’s the state law authority issue. The other was an establishment clause defense.

As tour honor knows, the 2nd Circuit ruled in another case that it wouldn’t violate the establishment clause and I’m not foolish enough to tell you that we don’t feel covered by that decision, regardless of whether we disagree with it. So I’m prepared with regard to the establishment clause affirmative defense or counterclaim to withdraw these claims on behalf of the Village of WHB.

Your honor has ruled on the state law issue and denied our request to appeal immediately. I understand that in our view what remains against the Village of WHB are some claims that A) were not ripe when they were filed, and B) during pendency of the litigation, the plaintiffs have submitted documents to this court telling the court that they have put up an Eruv and leches in the Village of WHB, the case is frivolous and moot, so it’s not ripe, it’s frivolous and it’s moot.

Two of those go to the Courts subject matter jurisdiction because if the case isn’t ripe, the court shouldn’t adjudicate the issues that the plaintiff wants adjudicated. Just for your Honor’s edification, there was a preliminary injunction hearing as soon as this case was started. The plaintiffs---

The Court: The issue before Judge Wexler.

Mr. Sokoloff: Yes. The plaintiff’s sole evidence of what the Village of WH did to allegedly prevent them from putting up an Eruv is one letter that says nothing. It doesn’t say, you’re prohibited from doing so. It doesn’t say, you will be prosecuted if you do so. It says nothing at all.

So our view and I expressed this at the beginning of the case, was that essentially what the plaintiff’s want is to come into court and get free legal advice. And courts don’t sit around and issue decisions just because somebody asks a court, is it legal? There has to be something that was done that creates a controversy. All the village did was respond to the complaint with defense and with counterclaims that are not adjudicated. So what I believe has to happen is one of two things: Either the plaintiffs can say to themselves, we got the Eruv, it’s up, there’s no reason for this court to further adjudicate this matter as to the Village of WHB and discontinue their claims against the Village, or the Court should allow me to move on subject matter jurisdiction to dismiss the case.

The Court: I understand a lot of this is probably just being tossed around for the first time today, so if you have any immediate response I’m happy to hear it.

Sugarman: I do, your honor. I frankly don’t understand the ripeness argument. I do understand that all the village did argument an that was the position of the village at the preliminary injunction hearing but there were no depositions taken before the preliminary injunction hearing.

It’s the plaintiff’s view that it’s not all the village did. The only way we’re going to be able to determine that is to take depositions of the mayor and the members of the council to see whether the village did more than that and whether, as a result of that, there is support and substantiations for the other claims that I’ve enumerated before. So I don’t see the justification for an argument that these other claims should be dismissed based on a preliminary injunction hearing which took place before there was any document discovery or deposition discovery. I just don’t understand that.

Sokoloff: Can I just respond briefly?

Court: Sure.

Sokoloff: It’s not a motion to dismiss based upon the preliminary injunction hearing. It would be a motion to dismiss based on the pleading, in other words a 12(c) motion.

And the plaintiff’s are the ones who have the burden. According to their claims, they are saying, you prevented us from putting up an eruv, well when they came in and said you prevented us from putting up an eruv they should know what the Village did. They can’t come in here and say, you prevented us from putting up an eruv but we don’t know how you prevented us, we don’t know what you did to prevent us, we need to take discovery to find out from you because you know what you did but you never alerted us to it. That’s not a claim.

P 11 (continued)

The Court: All right. Go ahead.

Mr Buchweitz: Your Honor, just one more point: The Village of Westhampton Beach, on Jul 6, 2012, withdrew its contention that our complaint should be dismissed on the ground of ripeness and/or lack of justiciability and that was filed in court.

Mr Sokoloff: That is true and I have the stipulation. However, it was premised upon the plaintiff’s agreement not to put up an Eruv during the pendency of this litigation. So that’s number one. Number two, subject matter jurisdiction cannot be waived. It can be raised at any point during the litigation, even on appeal.

The Court: I think part of what they’re raising here is, what is the impact of the stipulation? And there’s case law on that but we’ll talk about that. Go ahead.

Erica W: Erica W for Verizon. Just to be clear, Westhampton withdrawal of its ripeness and justiciability claims was not premised on Verizon’s agreement. Verizon’s agreement to forego putting up leches was contingent upon WHB unequivocally agreeing to withdraw its ripeness and justiciability claims.

Mr. Buchweitz: Your Honor, just one more point. Yehuda Buchweitz, Weil Gotschal.

What I heard from Mr. Sokoloff again for the first time—I wish we could have heard this weeks ago—about dropping his defenses or his counterclaims. He has no counterclaims in our case, he has no counterclaims against Verizon and LIPA. So it’s not clear to me what he would be dropping. But if he’s saying that he’s willing to enter into a judgment on our declaratory judgment claim that there’s no law that prevents the Eruv and agree to a permanent injunction we’d be happy to hear that.

The Court: All right. We’re not going to resolve this here this moment. Let me go on to round two here with the next case, and I’ll tell you what my thoughts are when we conclude that. That would be Verizon’s case.

Mr. Sugarman: With respect to the Eruv Association, you’ve got Quogue and SH.

The Court: Yes, my apologies, that’s right we need to get to Quogue, which Mr. Arntsen, I assume is—

Mr. Arntsen: Yes, that’s me, your honor.

The Court: Although you don’t look like Ms. De Jong, I assume you’re here—

Mr. Arntsen: I’m here in her stead, your honor.

The Court: Okay.

Mr. Arntsen: Essentially, the issue of whether you have the jurisdiction to decide the question and interpretation of the sign ordinance—the encroachment ordinances rather is the primary issue that’s left to be decided here at least for the moment. We believe, as we’ve argued in the letter briefing process, that we don’t—

The Court: I don’t take any offense at that.

Mr. Arntsen: Thank you, your honor. And you also wrote fairly extensively, I think, in the SH decision on that very subject and held that you should not exercise supplemental jurisdiction in that context. So far as we’re concerned, that’s the principal issue that needs resolution before whatever is to proceed actually proceeds.

The Court: Okay. Somebody else I missed here.

Ms. Liccione: That would be me, your Honor. Good Afternoon. Maureen Liccione, Jaspan Schlesiger. Your Honor, with all due respect, I want to correct some of the statements Mr. Sugarman made in so far as they relate to the Town of SH. Your honor will recall that the first complaint against the Town of SH was dismissed and that was only after Judge Wexler ruled on the preliminary injunction hearing that the plaintiff was unlikely to succeed against the Town of SH. So when there’s a reference to four or five years’ worth of litigation, I just would ask the Court and the parties to remember that with respect to SH.

There’s a case that I believe is only a year old. The second complaint, your honor dismissed a significant portion of that and sent it to state court and satyed the rest of the case. That case, the Article 78 proceeding, the town is handling as a garden- variety variance application, should we make an exception to our sign law. So our case is relatively new in that regard. But more than that, your Honor, I would submit that moving forward with discovery against SH in particular would not be appropriate at this time for a few reasons. First it would work to the prejudice of SH. It’s not the town’s fault, if you will, for lack of a better term, that the plaintiff brought an unripe action against the town, It was unripe because they did not bring a land use application. It is not the town’s fault that rather than pursue an Article 78 proceeding to vacate a garden variety zoning board decision, that the plaintiff chose to come to federal court instead of proceeding with a state court remedy.

So I think the town is being prejudiced by the, if you will and with all due respect, the plaintiff’s choice of inappropriate remedies. I would add to that, your honor, that the town spent literally tens of thousands of dollars on document discovery, only to have portions of the case dismissed and a stay issued.

The Town Of SH, I would point out, is much, much larger than the 2 villages. It has a very large year-round population. It has its own police department. It has innumerable computers and hardware that had to be searched. The town expended exorbitant amounts of money—we are not insured—to only have the case dismissed and then partially dismissed and stayed.

Finally your Honor, and if you’ll bear with me, this is the first I heard from the plaintiff that they would like to vacate the stay that your Honor issued some months ago. I don’t know what the basis would be to vacate a very long and detailed decision. Counsel has brought no argument before the Court as to why a stay should be issued. It hasn’t moved to reargue, it hasn’t moved to vacate the stay. Really what the plaintiff is saying is because the other two municipality cases has been laying around for a long time, the stay against SH should be vacated, and I would certainly strenuously object to that, your Honor, Thank you.

The Court: All right.

Mr. Sugar man: Your Honor, may I briefly respond to that?

The Court: Sure.

Mr. Sugarman: To call the controversy in SH a “garden variety zoning matter” is just a misperception of what this is all about. This is about the denial of first Amendment religious freedom rights to residents of the Town of SH. To pass it off as a garden- variety zoning matter is just a misperception and mischaracterization of what this is all about. One portion was dismissed and that’s the portion that is now in state court, but there are other portions that assert the free exercise claim, the 1983 claim, the Rilupa claim and on and on, which the Plaintiff’s are entitled to have resolved. The fact that SH chose not to be insured and chose to defend against all these claims is their own choice, and it ought not to be at all persuasive for them to come in and plead poverty in effect is what they’re doing—they’re a huge town with a huge budget.

The plaintiff has asserted significant constitutional statutory claims against the Town of SH. Yes, Ms. Liccione is right, this is the first time she’s heard of our request to lift the stay but it’s the first opportunity that we’ve had to do it. And to the extent—and my recollection is that your Honor did have an extensive review and opinion with respect to the dismissal of the one claim but then just stayed all the rest. I don’t recall they’re being a lot of other either briefing or discussion in your opinion of that.

So I return to where I started, which is we believe that we should be able to go forward so that we’re not into the seventh and eight years. Yes, there was a hiatus but the Town of SH was here at the beginning. They produced all of the documents that have been required. We’ve produced all the document to the Town of SH. So maybe with respect to the Town of SH, it’s a two-and a-half year case as opposed to a four- year case, but it’s a distinction without a difference. Thank you.

Ms. Liccione: Your Honor, may I be heard very briefly?

Court: Sure.

Ms Liccione: Thank you. Your Honor, if the state court upholds the zoning board’s determination to not allow this group to defy its sign law, as any other applicant would have to do for any other purpose, religious or otherwise, it would seem to me that this case is over, that there would be nothing to litigate. So to put the Town of SH through discovery for a case that could—either the Supreme Court of Suffolk County or the Appellate Division Second Department will put an end to seems to be a terrible waste of municipal resources.

With respect to my reference to “garden variety”, I meant no offense to the plaintiff. But certainly the issue before SH is not before the SH zoning board of Appeals. They are separate entities. The issue before the Zoning Board of Appeals is, can we make an exception to a zoning law for anyone? That is the issue. If I’m repeating myself, I’m sorry. If the Supreme Court on the Second Department says that we’re within their rights to do so, it seems to me there is no federal case. Thank you, your Honor.

Court: Let’s move on to Verizon’s case against the Village of WHB, et al.

Ms. Weisgerber: Erica Weisgerber for Verizon again, your Honor.

Taking each municipality one at a time and I believe I likely speak for LIPA as well on most of this but I’ll allow Mr. Murdock to—

Court: Can I get you a little closer to the microphone? I’m having a little trouble hearing you.

Page 20

Ms Weisgerber: Sure. I said, I believe I speak on behalf of both utilities but Mr. Murdock will certainly correct or join in after I’m done. But with respect to WHB first of all, the utility’s primary claim against WHB regarding the applicability and enforceability of their ordinances was decided by your Honor’s June 16th, 2014 ruling, where the court ruled that WHB had not passed any ordinance that prohibited the attachment of leches to utility poles.

With respect to our affirmative claims against WHB, the only thing that would remain is declaratory judgment on our affirmative claims against them. With respect to WHB’s establishment clause claims, certainly if WHB withdraws those claims, they are no longer in action. If WHB does not withdraw those claims we believe the issues are squarely covered by second Circuit’s recent decision.

With respect to WHN claims regarding ripeness and justiciability which we’re just hearing for the first time today, as mentioned, your Honor, WHB withdrew those claims unequivocally. It’s document number 56 on the docket in this action,

11-cv-252.

With respect to Quogue as mentioned in the East End Eruv Association’s case, I believe the primary issue that remains is whether the Court can determine whether the Quogue village code applies to the leches in light of the Quogue Board of Trustees’ decision, and that’s the issue that’s currently pending before the Court. We, of course believe that the Court can determine that issue and we believe that the Quogue village code does not apply to the leches. That issue is also briefed for your Honor already. We believe that all the issues remaining between the utilities and Quogue are issues of law that can be resolved on the papers and that there would not be remaining issues following that.

With respect to SH, our claims against SH still remain. Our case actually is more than four years old against SH, your Honor. Our case was simply stayed against SH pending resolution or refilling of the EEEA’s claims and resolution of the issues pending between the EEEA and SH.

I believe the utilities do not think we require any further discovery on our claims against SH and that those also involve issues of law that can be resolved on the papers. But at this time, the case remains—discovery in the case remains stayed.

The Court: Okay.

Mr. Murdock: Good afternoon, your Honor. For LIPA, Zachary Murdock. I concur with Ms. Weisgerber’s presentation. I would take the opportunity to comment that hope does spring eternal. After the Second Circuit’s ruling, which obviated I believe the principle and perhaps the most principled of the municipalities’grounds for opposing the installation of the eruv. I certainly hope and I continue to hope that for the benefit of taxpayers and ratepayers, that there could be a resolution at this point. If anyone has suggestions along thpose lines, I’d be happy to entertain them. Thank you, your Honor.

The Court: Thank you.

Mr. Sugarman: May I respond?

The Court: Absolutely.

Mr. Sokoloff: My response to the utilities’ presentation is essentially the same as it was to Mr. Sugarman’s. My client is in a different situation than the other two utilities, the other two municipalities.

The Court: After a while it all starts sounding the same, so go ahead.

Mr. Sokolff: There’s an eruv up, or so the plaintiffs say—there’s an eruv up in Williamson today. The fact that there is federal litigation against a municipality who never said you can’t put it up, who never enacted a law that would cover it, yet is sitting here as a defendant in federal litigation, really to me is a farce.

It would seem to me that the federal courts have a lot better things to do than to just engage in academic exercises, but that’s all this is against my client. And now that we’re here, I defy the plaintiffs to point to anything that WHB ever did to prevent them from putting up an eruv.

The Court: Well, before we start defying everybody, let me throw this out. One of the things I really did want to get to today is, in light of the Second Circuit’s decisions, is there hope here at all of trying to resolve these cases without the money it’s going to cost everybody to continue litigating them, the fees mounting.

We’re in the midst of cross-shifting statutes. We have municipalities on the other end here. I’m just trying to figure out if—how should I put this—calmer minds can ultimately prevail here. Really, I’d like you all to be very candid. I’m more than happy to try to conduct a settlement conference here, if the parties are willing to participate in good faith to come to a resolution.

There are some things today that were brought up for the first time that I’m going to have you talk to each other about before I decide anything further. But I really would like an answer to this question first. Is there any prospect of settling these cases?

Mr. Sugarman: Your Honor, on behalf of the EEEA, we would welcome the opportunity for your Honor or, in the event that your Honor doesn’t think you should do it—

The Court: Yes.

Mr. Sugarman: --one of your colleagues, to have a round of settlement discussions.

We would approach those in the utmost of good faith, with an attempt to resolve these questions.

The Court: Let me switch over to the other side. Let me work my way back to you. Let’s start at the other end of the table first.

Mr. Arntsen: Your Honor. I think fundamentally, the question of the validity of the village’s encroachment ordinance—

The Court: Has to be resolved.

Mr. Arntsen: --is very significant to the Village. As the trustees stated in their decision, they acroos the board prohibit anything to be affixed to these poles for the very reason that the flood gates could be opened once they start. So the problem we have—

The Court: So your clients are concerned for the ramifications of this down the road.

Mr. Arntsen: Certainly, your Honor, because nobody knows where—

The Court: I mean beyond the scope of this case.

Mr. Artsen: Yes, I understood you to mean that, ye, your Honor.

The Court: Okay.

Mr. Arntsen: So that’s a question that frankly I think needs to be answered and the Village believes it should be answered elsewhere than in this federal court.

The Court: Okay.

Ms. Liccione: Your Honor, I would echo Mr. Arntsen’s comments, and I think it’s even, if I might, it’s even a shade stronger for the Town of SH. We have a very encompassing sign ordinance that prohibits anything from being put in the public right of way or on the poles, with some limited statutory exceptions.

If one thing became clear to me, and I think in the record, in the preliminary injunction hearing and in the discovery that I have reviewed, is that the town—maybe the word stridently is too strong but the town vigorously enforces this sign ordinance over its 500-plus miles of roadway and the thousands upon thousands of poles. The floodgates would open and the town believes that its sign ordinance is at risk and has ramifications far beyond this case.

The Court: All right. You’re up.

Mr. Sokolff: Well, I came in here with two practical suggestions to save people money. One’s in withdrawing the remaining claim that we had. And two in urging the plaintiffs to discontinue. And if they do that they have the eruv that they seek. So that’s my answer.

The Court: All right.

Mr. Sugarman: Your Honor, two observations.

The Court: Sure.

Mr. Sugarman: First, with respect to the Village of Quogue, Judge Wexler denied their request long ago to send us to state court, and I think we’ve made that argument to your Honor and it’s before you. Secondly, I understand the argument that the Town of SH and the Village of Quogue can’t do anything but in a way, I don’t understand it, because the difference between this case and the garden variety cases that my colleagues are talking about is that this case involves constitutional rights.

So to the extent that there’s a willingness, it would seem to me that there is a way to craft an agreement in this case so as to preserve the positions of the Village of Quogue and the Town of SH with respect to the sanctity of their sign laws. We do have an argument, your Honor, which we will pursue that those sign laws are not as sacrosanct as counsel is claiming but that’s another view.

Far be it from me to advise my colleagues but it seems to me that having been through more than one of these settlements discussions over the years, where principle positions have been taken, people find a way to preserve their principles and still resolve the case.

The Court: Let me ask you a question along those lines. Have you ever presented a proposal to the Village about the wording—I’m not asking you to buy this. I’m just thinking out loud here—proposal as to the wording of the ordinance that would enable you to live with what’s there and allow them to live with what’s there?

Mr. Sugarman: No. We’ve never gotten to that discussion back and forth with them about this concern and this issue.

Mr. Buchweitz: Your Honor, one thing that could be very clear. The Town of SH’s sign law, which of course we think doesn’t apply, has a number of exceptions. And it would be very, very simple, if they wanted to, to have an exception for leches.

The Court: Okay. Let me just focus on Quogue for a minute because that’s where I am, all right? As to Quogue—and what I really don’t want to have happen here is that people are spinning their wheels for no good purpose.

Mr. Arntsen, obviously, I’m putting you on the spot but I’m doing it anyway.

Mr. Arntsen: Okay.

The Court: Would your clients do you think even be open to a suggested proposal with regard to the language?

Mr. Arntsen: Your Honor—

The Court: Understanding that they have the right to say, no, we can’t live with this. I get that.

Mr. Arntsen: Your Honor, I’ve been before this court enough for you to know that I rarely foreclose the opportunity to have a discussion. But that being said, I think the problem with rewording the ordinance—again, I don’t know what the proposal might be—is it that it would invoke precisely the type of constitutional concerns that our ordinance does not give rise to because it’s so plainly worded and so across the board prohibitive so to tinker with that in my estimation, would be an invitation for a real problem that again transcends the case.

The Court: All right.

Mr. Arntsen: I would caution them, if they were to engage in a discussion, that they would be really treading on thin ice to try to put wording into this that would somehow craft an exclusion for a religious group when, as it’s worded now, as they’ve already decided themselves, the board, nobody is allowed to do it. We avoid these questions because of it.

The Court: Look, you certainly have been before me often enough that I know you speak with candor and you’re very straightforward in your responses.

Mr. Arntsen: Thank you, your Honor.

The Court: So I’ve no reason to doubt what you’re telling me. What I don’t want to have happen is that the plaintiffs are put to the additional work of putting some kind of proposal together and then it’s pretty clear there’s virtually no circumstance under which the town or Village, excuse me, could adopt it. So if that’s the case and that’s candidly what you’re telling me, which it sure sounds like what you’re telling me, then I’m not going to put them through that exercise for nothing.

Mr. Arntsen: I think I would your Honor’s phrasing that there’s virtually no chance.

The Court: Okay, I have no doubt, based on what I’ve heard already, that that carries over to SH.

Ms. Liccione: Yes, your Honor, and if I might comment briefly. I apologize for laughing a little bit but the notion that a local law can easily be tinkered with by the waiving of a magic wand kind of bespeaks a—I don’t really know the word but a lack of knowledge about the way municipal law works. A local law has to be noticed and a hearing held. We cannot enter into a stipulation saying that we will pass a law. A law has to go through its natural processes for due process, among othwer purposes.

The Court: All right.

Ms. Liccione: So I would just add that to the mix.

Page 31

The Court: Look, one of the things I’ve learned, not only as a mediator before I took the bench but certainly in my experiences trying to do alternative dispute resolutions since I’ve been on the bench---and I do these sessions some weeks every single day. I can’t bring somebody into a settlement discussion where it’s pretty clear to me the parties fell constrained that no matter what’s offered, they’re not going to come to a resolution. So I’m not going to do that. What I will proceed to do, and I’m restricting this for the moment, but as to Quogue and as to SH, I will proceed to do what I have to do on pending motions at this point.

As to WHB, Mr. Sokoloff brought up a couple of interesting topics and suggestions today. And I know that for the plaintiffs, it’s the first time they’ve heard this. And what I would like is for you folks to at least talk further. I’ll give you an opportunity to discuss this before I take any further actions with regard to the Village of WHB.

So what I would propose at this point is that you folks---I’d really like to make sure you carve out times for this because this is not a conversation you’re going to have in 5 minutes. I’m going to give you the next 3 weeks to talk to each other about some of the issues that Mr. Sokoloff raised today, some of the issues you’ve raised today, and to find out, is there a way to settle all of this, part of this, or none of this, as to the Village of WHB. I want you to report back to me at the end of that 3week period. If the answer is we can’t get to a meeting of the minds, then the alternative and what I want you to do at that point is to provide me with a list, please no longer than two pages, of what you perceive still has to be done in this case.

I know you’re going to be asking for some discovery and for me to lift certain stays I put in place with regard to discovery. I just want a list of things you believe the Court has to address at that point, and I want to get those resolved expeditiously, all right. I really do wan to get these cases back on track and move them forward, so we’re not sitting here next year saying, now we’re in the 6th year, etc. That doesn’t behoove any of us.

Now these cases have all been officially reported to Washington as being older than 3 years old, so it shows up on all my cases over 3 years old. So I have my own incentive for trying to get a resolution here in the end as well.

I appreciate everybody’s candor today and in so many cases like this, not that any of them are identical by any means, but there are emotional issues in addition to the legal issues on every side of these cases. Sometimes it leads us to places that we might not otherwise go, just in terms of responding to things. But what I’m saying to you is, we are going to get a resolutions here of each of these cases one way or the other, and I really do want to focus on getting things back on track here. I’m not looking for anything in writing from SH or from Quogue based on what I just told you.